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I. Introduction
Immigrants in the United States are a diverse and growing population. Issues surrounding immigration have long been at the forefront of policy discussions. A long-standing policy discussion has centered on the costs imposed by immigrants and their children. It has been argued that immigrant children inflict substantial expenses on local and state-level governments in charge of education and health-related expenditures (Borjas, 1999) . And, although such allegations have been questioned by various researchers (see Griswold (2012) for a review of that literature), they have implanted a genuine concern in society about the ability of immigrants "to pay their way" into the welfare state and the possibility that welfare serves as a magnet. These concerns were probably partially responsible for some of the provisions in the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). In the legislation,
PRWORA denied most means-tested assistance to immigrants arriving after its enactment date of August 22, 1996, during their first 5 years of legal residency in the United States. Additionally, it limited the eligibility of non-citizens arriving before that date to one year -although this latter provision was never fully enforced. Not surprisingly, immigrant welfare participation decreased (Borjas, 2001; Mazzolari, 2004; Bitler and Hoynes, 2011) . However, we still do not know how immigrant fertility was impacted by PRWORA.
In this paper, we use data on the fertility of the non-institutionalized population collected by the Current Population Survey (CPS) in June for the years 1994, 1995, 1998 and 2000 to address that gap in the literature by examining how PRWORA affected the fertility of immigrant women. 2 Because PRWORA reduced immigrant eligibility and welfare participation, it seems reasonable to expect welfare reform to have significantly lowered immigrant fertility. And, 2 indeed, we find that non-citizens living in states that did not offer state-funded benefits such as
Medicaid or TANF reduced their fertility in response to the legislation. Furthermore, these women became more likely to be at work, possibly to replace lost benefits with employersponsored benefits.
Understanding how immigrant fertility responds to policy changes is particularly important given that immigrant women tend to have more children than their native counterparts (Dye, 2008) . Looming concerns about the solvency of the Social Security system and an aging population that could benefit from a younger workforce make understanding determinants of immigrant fertility a particularly salient concern (d' Addio and d'Ercole, 2005; Sevak and Schmidt, 2008) .
II. Background on Welfare Reform and Immigrant Fertility
Previous literature has established links between fertility and welfare benefits. For example, researchers examined how the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program -the precursor to the current welfare system: Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)-impacted the fertility of AFDC eligible women (primarily low educated and unmarried). For the most part, these studies exploited the state-level variation in AFDC benefits across time and, as summarized by Moffitt (1992 Moffitt ( , 1998 , their main conclusion was that the effects of AFDC benefits on fertility were small to non-existent.
In the time period leading up to PRWORA, states were granted waivers to experiment with policies aimed at reducing the fertility of recipients. For example, a number of states enacted the "minor parent provision" -requiring that a teen who received welfare must live at home with her parents (or under adult supervision) to receive benefits. Many states also enacted 3 "family caps"-provisions that denied incremental increases in welfare benefits for women who had another child while receiving benefits.
After the passage of PRWORA, more states adopted such policies and these policies, in addition to the work requirements and time limits on welfare receipt contained within PRWORA, made it more difficult to support a child while on welfare, thus raising the cost of a birth. Much research has been aimed at discovering how these PRWORA provisions may have affected the fertility of welfare eligible women. The evidence from these other studies has been, however, quite mixed (see Blank, 2002 for a review of these studies). Notably, although Hispanic women -many of whom were immigrants, had the highest rates of teenaged and non-marital childbearing of any major racial or ethnic group in the United States before welfare reform (Graefe et al., 2008) , 3 none of the studies examined how immigrant fertility was impacted by PRWORA and the state provisions. In fact, we only know of one study examining the fertility of Hispanic immigrants (i.e. Falasco and Heer, 1984) . However, the analysis predates welfare reform and, as such, does not address how welfare reform impacted immigrant fertility.
We are particularly interested in addressing that question -namely, how the fertility of immigrant woman changed after the imposition of PRWORA. With the enactment of PRWORA, Congress imposed a variety of restrictions on legal immigrants' access to welfare, which may have also had an effect on their fertility above and beyond changes in work requirements, family caps and time limits on the receipt of benefits. PRWORA dramatically altered the access of non-citizens to programs such as TANF, food stamps and Medicaid. In particular, after PRWORA, non-citizens, particularly those arriving post-enactment, became ineligible for TANF and Medicaid for their first five years living in the United States, although 4 states could offer benefits to new immigrants using their own funds (Haskins, 2006; Nam, 2011; Bitler and Hoynes, 2011) . Legal temporary residents and undocumented immigrants were never eligible for federal welfare benefits and, hence, should have experienced few, if any, changes after welfare reform (Fix and Zimmerman, 1998) . The greatest variation in access to welfare among immigrants has been for post-enactment arrivals, i.e. those immigrants who arrived after PRWORA as a result of the federal requirement that any funding of benefits for that group must not be paid for with federal monies (Fix and Passel, 2002 ). Yet, although TANF is the most expensive benefit for states to provide, many states continued to support recent immigrant families using their own state funds (Graefe et al., 2008; Bitler and Hoynes, 2011). 4 Because states had the option to extend welfare benefits to immigrants who arrived after August 22, 1996, and virtually all states extended benefits to pre-enactment immigrants (Fix and Zimmermann, 1998) , there was some uncertainty over who was eligible for benefits. This confusion led to what Fix and Passel (1999) termed a 'chilling effect', which may have discouraged immigrants from using benefits such as TANF and Medicaid even though they remained eligible. Evidence on the existence of this chilling effect can be found in the literature linking PRWORA to health insurance. For example, Lurie (2008) examines the effect of welfare reform on the health insurance coverage of children of non-permanent residents. Specifically, using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), Lurie finds that the proportion of uninsured citizen children of non-permanent residents rose by 17 percentage-points post-PRWORA despite the fact that these children were eligible for Medicaid. In a similar vein, 4 Immigrant participation in welfare programs kept on growing since then (Borjas, 2003) . Hence, one might ask: why did some states decide to maintain immigrants' access to programs such as TANF, food stamps and Medicaid while other states did not? Early work on this question indicated that the size of the state's noncitizen population was unrelated to program generosity toward immigrants in the first years following PRWORA (Zimmerman and Tumlin, 1999) . However, states with strong immigrant advocacy groups and a liberal voting public were more consistent predictors of state generosity towards immigrants (Graefe et al. 2008 ). Kalil and Ziol-Guest (2009) use SIPP data to examine, instead, the effect of PRWORA on the health of the children of immigrants. Most of the children in their sample were born in the United States and would have, thus, remained eligible for Medicaid even after welfare reform.
Yet, the health of these children was poorer after the passage of PRWORA. The authors interpret this finding as a chilling effect of welfare reform on immigrant children's access to health services. In further support of this chilling effect, an evaluation of welfare reform's effect on immigrants conducted in Los Angeles and New York City found that many immigrants believed that receiving welfare benefits might endanger their immigration status or prevent them from obtaining green cards, reentering the country, or becoming citizens. Further, many immigrant families indicated that they were confused by the changes in welfare rules that occurred in 1996. Therefore, many immigrants might have believed that all foreign-born were disqualified (Capps et al., 2002) .
Particularly relevant to our analysis are several recent papers focused on the effect of PRWORA provisions on the health insurance coverage of immigrants (Borjas, 2003; Kaushal and Kaestner, 2005 ) -a crucial factor in deciding whether to have children. Using data from the 1995 to 2001 Current Population Surveys (CPS) and a difference-in-difference methodology, Borjas (2003) compares changes in the health insurance coverage of immigrants in more generous states following the enactment of PRWORA, to the health insurance coverage changes experienced by immigrants in less generous states. He finds that the fraction of immigrants not covered by health insurance remained more or less stable (or slightly fell) after PRWORA.
Since most non-citizens in the sample had arrived before 1996 and, therefore, maintained eligibility for Medicaid, Borjas concluded that the small declines in Medicaid participation stemmed from the chilling effects of welfare reform. Overall, however, the fact that health 6 insurance coverage among the immigrant population did not change much is attributed to their increased labor supply, which likely increased their probability of being covered by employersponsored health insurance. Therefore, he does find a labor market adjustment as a result of state-level generosity in welfare and Medicaid benefits. Kaushal and Kaestner (2005) use data from the CPS (years 1994 to 2001) and a similar difference-in-differences research design to extend Borjas' (2003) analysis. They focus on loweducated unmarried women (a group they term: "target group") and, instead of native women, they use other immigrants as a control group. In addition, they carefully examine the 'chilling effect' hypothesis. They do so by, first, dividing the group of low-educated unmarried immigrants into two sub-groups: those who arrived less than five years ago and those that arrived more than five years ago. They argue that, if the two groups were similarly affected by PRWORA, it would be consistent with the chilling effect hypothesis because immigrants who arrived more recently should be more adversely affected by the law. Subsequently, they differentiate pre-1996 arrival and post-1996 arrival immigrants according to whether they lived in a state that created a substitute TANF or Medicaid program for post-1996 immigrants. If PRWORA affected both groups of immigrants similarly, they argue that PRWORA must have had a chilling effect as well. They report that the effect of TANF on the health insurance coverage of foreign-born, unmarried women did not differ by their length of stay in the U.S.
providing support for the chilling hypothesis.
Additional evidence of a chilling effect comes from Mazzolari (2004) 
III. Data and Some Descriptive Statistics
To examine how the enactment of PRWORA affected the fertility of immigrant women, we gather data on the fertility of the non-institutionalized female population collected by the Current Population Survey (CPS) in June for the years 1994, 1995, 1998 and 2000 . The survey also gathers information on the immigration status of respondents, allowing us to differentiate between native born U.S. citizens, those who are foreign-born naturalized U.S. citizens and foreign-born who have not become citizens. Additionally, with the information on their year of arrival to the United States, we are able to differentiate foreign-born non-citizens according to 8 whether they had been in the country at least 6 years -making them eligible for most types of public assistance, or less.
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Because our focus is on fertility, we limit our analysis to women aged 15 to 44.
Additionally, we restrict our attention to women most likely to qualify for welfare; i.e. unmarried women with a high-school education or less (similar to Kaushal and Kaestner, 2005) . Table 1 displays basic descriptive statistics regarding the share giving birth for our various sub-samples.
Overall, there are significant differences in fertility across respondents depending on their immigration status and ethnicity. As can be seen from Table 1 , the share of women in our sample giving birth in the survey year is significantly higher among immigrants, particularly among non-citizens. This is also the case for Hispanics, regardless of their immigration status.
The fertility rates in Table 1 range from 8.88 percent for non-Hispanic natives, to 15.61 percent for Hispanic foreign-born non-citizens. Meanwhile, the share of native women giving birth averaged 9.03 percent in our sample.
As noted, PRWORA eliminated benefits to immigrants for their first five years of arrival in the United States. However, a key provision of PRWORA was that a state could choose to fund these benefits for immigrants and many states choose to do this. We follow Borjas (2003) and classify states as being generous (i.e. they replaced federal cuts with state monies to maintain at least some benefits for immigrants) and non-generous (i.e. they did not replace federal cutbacks with state aid). These states are presented in Table A We distinguish between five groups of women in our regression analyses. Summary statistics for these five sub-samples are shown in Table B therefore, they were not subject to the 5-year bar. Finally, other sample characteristics worth noting include race and ethnicity. Up to 25 percent of our sample is black and 15 percent
Hispanic. This is due to our focus on women more likely to qualify for welfare (i.e. unmarried and low-educated women). On average, these women have slightly less than one child -the exception being Hispanic women (Panel E), who have slightly more than one child. Similarly, slightly more than half of our relatively low-educated sample has less than a high-school education, except for Hispanic women, who are significantly less educated.
In Table 2 , we conduct a descriptive double-difference analysis using average birth rates for various groups before and after the passage of PRWORA in states that had cutbacks in welfare eligibility and in states that did not. To conduct this analysis, we divide our sample into five panels (Hispanic immigrants, all immigrants, non-Hispanic natives, all natives, and Hispanic natives); two groups of states (states with cutbacks and states without welfare eligibility cutbacks) and two time periods (pre-PRWORA and post-PRWORA).
As seen in Panel A of While the double-difference estimates for non-Hispanic natives, all natives and Hispanic natives (Panels C, D and E of Table 2 ) are also negative, they are not economically large.
Because the aforementioned difference-in-difference estimates focus on immigrants, it is
useful to compare what the apparent impact of PRWORA was for those groups to how fertility patterns were changing among natives. We do so in the last three columns of Table 2 .
Regardless of whether we use non-Hispanic native women or all native women as a comparison group, the triple difference estimates suggests that PRWORA lowered Hispanic immigrant women's childbearing likelihood by approximately 9.4 percentage points. When we widen the treatment group to all immigrant women, we continue to find a statistically significant reduction in the likelihood of giving birth, but the point estimate is much smaller at 5.4 percentage points.
Finally, when we restrict our groups to Hispanics and compare immigrants to natives, we find a statistically significant decline in the fertility of Hispanic immigrants relative to Hispanic natives. This latter finding speaks against a chilling effect. In other words, we would expect a significant difference in these two groups' childbearing propensities after the policy, which is exactly what we find. In the next section, we extend our methodology to add additional controls and address heterogeneity in our immigrant group.
IV. Methodology
Our primary aim is to gauge the impact that the 1996 welfare reform might have had on the fertility of foreign-born women and, in particular, of foreign-born non-citizens. With that intent, we classify foreign-born women in two groups: foreign-born naturalized and foreign-born non-citizens. We pursue a triple difference specification where we pool the CPS data for the calendar years 1994, 1995, 1998 and 2000 and estimate linear probability models where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the ith woman had a birth in that year:
where y ist is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ith woman living in state s had a birth in year t.
The vector X ist contains various socioeconomic characteristics of the woman including her age, race, ethnicity (when working with all natives and immigrants), and educational status. Post t is a dummy equal to 1 if the observation refers to the post-PRWORA period (that is: 1998-2000).
The vector I i indicates the immigration status of the respondent. In our simplest specification, I i equals 1 if the person is foreign-born. In subsequent specifications, I i stands for a set of dummy variables indicative of whether the respondent is a naturalized immigrant or a foreign-born noncitizen. 6 The reference group is native-born women who are similarly skilled and are also 
V. Results
6 Because immigrants who have been in the country for five years or longer could apply for benefits, splitting the sample according to the migration spell of migrants would make sense given that the cutbacks exclusively impacted newly arrived immigrants. Note, however, that our last year of data is 2000 and PRWORA was enacted in 1996. Therefore, all naturalized immigrants (all with, at least, 5 years of permanent residency in the United States) in our sample had arrived pre-PRWORA. Similarly, all immigrants who arrived post-PRWORA in our sample are noncitizens.
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A) Immigrant Fertility Response Table 3 displays the triple-difference coefficient vector 7 estimated using the various samples previously discussed and included in Panels A through E of Table B in the appendix.
The specification reported in the first column does not include any controls and is identical to the specification in the last three columns of Across all five panels and all four specifications, the coefficients on the triple interaction term are negative, and for the first three Panels (A, B and C) the coefficient is statistically significant even when adding the full set of controls. In Panel A, fertility rates drop between 6.8 and 9.4 percentage points for Hispanic immigrants relative to non-Hispanic natives. Similar declines are found when expanding the control group to all natives, as shown in Panel B. In Panel C, we widen the treatment group to include all immigrant women and compare them to non-Hispanic natives. We find that the point estimate is negative, but smaller (4.3 in the full specification). Finally, in Panels D and E, as we compare all natives to all immigrants or Hispanic natives to Hispanic immigrants, the point estimates become insignificant in the most complete specification. These more muted results in Panels C, D and E may be picking up chilling effects felt by Hispanic Native-born women who are acting as controls in these 14 specifications. Panel E is a direct test of this hypothesis. While in Table 2 there was a statistically significant difference between Hispanic immigrants and natives which suggests no chilling effect, in Table 3 we find no difference which points towards a chilling effect. Overall, the results in Table 3 suggest that Hispanic immigrants, in particular, are driving the statistical significance of the policy on the fertility rates of immigrants. Table 4 further delineates the sample and provides two triple-difference coefficients that allow for differential effects among naturalized and foreign-born non-citizens. Specifications (1) to (4) are similar to those presented in Table 3 . And, just as we found in Table 3 , the triple difference estimates for naturalized immigrants in Table 4 are negative, but not statistically different from zero at conventional levels of significance. Not finding a significant reduction in fertility for that group is not surprising, and it simply suggests that this group was likely aware of the fact that these changes did not pertain to them. 7 In contrast, the impact of welfare reform on the fertility of foreign-born non-citizen women closely tracks the effects found in Table 3 .
Notably, in less generous states, foreign-born non-citizen women, particularly Hispanics, lowered the childbearing propensities by up to 10.6 percentage-points. Although birthright citizenship was not altered by the legislation and the children of immigrants would continue to have U.S. citizenship if born in the United States, our results suggest that a scaling back of public services dissuaded Hispanic immigrant women in less generous states from having children.
B) Immigrant Employment Response
In order to understand the driving forces behind the fertility decisions made by immigrant women, we also explore how state-level variation in generosity influenced these women's labor 15 supply. Of special interest to us is whether welfare reform induced these women to search for employment -possibly as a means to obtain health insurance coverage, and increased employment, in turn, lowered their childbearing likelihood. If, indeed, that was the case, foreign-born non-citizen women in less generous states should seem more likely to be at work after PRWORA than their native counterparts.
The results in Tables 5 and 6 provide strong evidence that state-funded assistance programs did have a significant impact on the labor supply decisions of immigrants. In both tables, we present regression results for specifications and samples along the lines to those displayed in Tables 3 and 4 . However, our dependent variable is now the probability of being employed. These regressions are also estimated as linear probability models for ease of exposition.
In Table 5 , the coefficient on the triple difference in the models estimating the probability of being employed ranges from 8.8 to 15.8 for our five samples and our four specifications.
There is some attenuation of the estimated impacts as additional controls are added to the model specification. As in the case in the fertility models, the largest and most robust estimates are found for Hispanic immigrants. This finding is consistent with prior findings in the literature according to which welfare reform increased the labor force participation of foreign-born, single mothers Kaushal, 2006, Borjas 2003 ) .
In Table 6 , we allow for differences by citizenship status of immigrants and compute two triple difference estimates for naturalized immigrants and foreign-born non-citizens. This table   mirrors Table 4 . The estimated coefficients consistently show that the employment probabilities of foreign-born non-citizen women increased sizably in those states that were less generous after PRWORA. The triple difference coefficients vary from 0.085 to 0.197 and are all statistically significant. Meanwhile, the triple-difference estimates for naturalized immigrants are never statistically significant in any of the 20 specifications.
In sum, our results provide evidence that the group most likely to be affected by the legislation -namely foreign-born non-citizens, particularly those of Hispanic origin-lowered their fertility and increased their labor supply in the aftermath of cutbacks in welfare eligibility.
C) Robustness Checks
One potential weakness of difference-in-difference analyses is the presence of pre-trends in the outcomes of interest prior to treatment. Specifically, in our case, we would be concerned if immigrant women already displayed lower fertility rates than their native counterparts prior to PRWORA. In that instance, we would not be able to conclusively assign the observed fertility impacts to the policy itself. To gauge if, indeed, fertility among immigrant women was already lower than that of native women prior to PRWORA, we conduct a falsification test. We restrict our sample to the years 1994 and 1995, and we falsely designate the post-PRWORA period to be 1995. The results from such an exercise for the various specifications being estimated in Tables   3 and 4 are displayed in Tables 7 and 8 , accordingly. It is clear from the figures in those tables that immigrant women, in particular Hispanic non-citizens, were not less likely than their native counterparts to have children prior to PRWORA. In fact, if anything, they were more likely, signaling that the policy must have been particularly effective. In sum, pre-treatment trends are not driving our results.
Another logical concern that arises in this type of analysis refers to the endogeneity of immigrants' location. The inverse relationship found between states' lower welfare generosity and immigrant childbearing might not stem from the ongoing policy changes but, rather, from the fact that immigrant women planning on having a baby leave less generous states for more generous ones. To examine if, indeed, that was occurring, we compute the share of immigrants per state and year and estimate state-level regressions examining the extent to which those shares are correlated to changes in the states' generosity following the enactment of PRWORA. Results from this additional robustness check are displayed in Table 9 . We find no evidence that states that became generous after the passage of welfare reform attracted more immigrants.
8
VI. Summary and Conclusions
We examine how the 1996 passage of PRWORA impacted the fertility of foreign-born women and, in particular, foreign-born non-citizen women. We find that non-citizen women living in states that did not offer state-funded food assistance or SSI following the enactment of PRWORA altered their fertility patterns in response to the new legislation. In contrast to earlier work that found evidence of a chilling effect on immigrants' use of benefits, we find results that are largely concentrated among the group targeted by the policy -namely: foreign-born noncitizens as opposed to naturalized immigrants. Our findings suggest that they may have entered the work force in order to receive benefits through their employer, as well as a sustainable level of income. These results line up with the evidence presented in Borjas (2003) regarding the switch to employer-provided health care from Medicaid among immigrant women as they became more likely to be employed. Overall, the findings provide further evidence of how immigrants respond to federal and state-level policy, contributing to the ongoing debate regarding state-level versus federal and comprehensive immigration policy.
Understanding how welfare policy shapes immigrant fertility is of special interest given growing concerns about the solvency of the U.S. Social Security system. The rapidly aging population, coupled with fertility rates that are just at or below replacement level, have led analysts to view immigration as a way to alleviate pressure on the pay as you go social security system (Social Security Advisory Report, 2005). Immigrants have higher fertility than the native born population (Camarota, 2005; Sevak and Schmidt, 2008) , in part due to their younger age.
In 2002, immigrant women from the top 10 origin countries had a total fertility rate of 2.9-well above the 2.01 that existed for the entire United States at that time, and a greater rate than did women from their home countries (at 2.3). Among newly migrated Mexican women, the total fertility rate was even greater at 3.5 (Camarota, 2005) . Our finding indicates that PROWRA decreased the fertility of immigrants; thus, policymakers need to be aware that this reduced fertility may have unintended consequences on the fiscal sustainability of other government programs. These results also provide insight into the potential impacts of comprehensive immigration reform, particularly the components related to the path to citizenship and access to public benefits. Notes: Specification (1) includes no controls. Specification (2) adds age, race and ethnicity to specification (1). Specification (3) adds educational attainment, no. of children, and a set of arrival cohort dummies to specification (2). Finally, specification (4) further includes the state unemployment rate, as well as state and year fixed effects, and a state-time trend to specification (3). All regressions include a constant term. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels for the dummy variables follow a one-tail test. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Notes: Specification (1) includes no controls. Specification (2) adds age, race and ethnicity to specification (1). Specification (3) adds educational attainment, no. of children, and a set of arrival cohort dummies to specification (2). Finally, specification (4) further includes the state unemployment rate, as well as state and year fixed effects, and a state-time trend to specification (3). All regressions include a constant term. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels for the dummy variables follow a one-tail test. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Notes: Specification (1) includes no controls. Specification (2) adds age, race and ethnicity to specification (1). Specification (3) adds educational attainment, no. of children, and a set of arrival cohort dummies to specification (2). Finally, specification (4) further includes the state unemployment rate, as well as state and year fixed effects, and a state-time trend to specification (3). All regressions include a constant term. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels for the dummy variables follow a one-tail test. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Notes: Specification (1) includes no controls. Specification (2) adds age, race and ethnicity to specification (1). Specification (3) adds educational attainment, no. of children, and a set of arrival cohort dummies to specification (2). Finally, specification (4) further includes the state unemployment rate, as well as state and year fixed effects, and a state-time trend to specification (3). All regressions include a constant term. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels for the dummy variables follow a one-tail test. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Notes:
The sample is limited to the years 1994 and 1995. Specification (1) includes no controls. Specification (2) adds age, race and ethnicity to specification (1). Specification (3) adds educational attainment, no. of children, and a set of arrival cohort dummies to specification (2). Finally, specification (4) further includes the state unemployment rate, as well as state and year fixed effects, and a state-time trend to specification (3). All regressions include a constant term. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels for the dummy variables follow a one-tail test. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The sample is limited to the years 1994 and 1995. Specification (1) includes no controls. Specification (2) adds age, race and ethnicity to specification (1). Specification (3) adds educational attainment, no. of children, and a set of arrival cohort dummies to specification (2). Finally, specification (4) further includes the state unemployment rate, as well as state and year fixed effects, and a state-time trend to specification (3). All regressions include a constant term. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels for the dummy variables follow a one-tail test. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Notes: Post-enactment foreign-born non-citizens are those with less than 6 years in the country, whereas Pre-enactment foreign-born non-citizens arrived to the Unites States at least 6 years ago.
